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Abstract
Today’s business is dependent on information; information about an individual’s financial
wealth, education, purchasing preferences and even health conditions. How companies treat the
information, or data, they accumulate from individuals is governed by the laws in which they are
incorporated and operate. Unfortunately, these laws often conflict especially when an American
business is operating in Europe. This conflict led the European Commission to develop data
privacy principles known as the Safe Harbor Directive, which if followed allowed US companies
to store and use EU customer data. However, a lawsuit challenging the legitimacy of the Safe
Harbor’s privacy protections for EU citizens resulted in a 2015 ruling by the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) that invalidated the Safe Harbor Directive. The chaos that resulted from this ruling
sent businesses on both sides of the Atlantic scrambling for an alternative. Unfortunately, Brexit
has made an extremely complex legal and business situation even more complicated. Brexit
raises two important questions concerning the EU’s recent invalidation of the Safe Harbor
Directive that this paper will address: 1) what impact will the UK’s decision to leave the EU
have on the newly enacted Privacy Shield and 2) what data privacy measures will the UK
implement when it is no longer part of the EU?
Keywords: Brexit, Safe Harbor, Privacy Shield, data, privacy, GDPR
Background
The ECJ’s ruling that invalidated the Safe Harbor agreement, under which American and
European enterprises had been operating since 2000, was handed down in 2015 (The High Court
of Ireland, 2015). The rationale for the court’s conclusion was that the Directive’s provisions did
not sufficiently protect European data in the United States (The High Court of Ireland, 2015). Its
immediate impact was felt by more than 4,400 US and European companies that relied on it to
transfer data back and forth in support of both trade and jobs (Nakashima, 2015). But the
elimination of the Safe Harbor agreement also had huge consequences for US intelligence
agencies, which depend on large volumes of international data in their perpetual search for clues
to disrupt terrorist plots (Nakashima, 2015).
The situation that gave rise to this precedent setting case arose when an Austrian citizen and
Facebook user, Max Schrems, filed a complaint with the Irish data protection commissioner
alleging that his Facebook data, which was transferred from Facebook’s Irish subsidiary to
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servers in the United States, was inadequately protected (Price, 2015). He based his claims on
news reports that described US government surveillance of personal data as revealed in
documents leaked by a former US government contractor, Edward Snowden (Price, 2015).
Schrems’s complaint was rejected by the Irish commissioner who cited a European Commission
decision from 2000, which determined that the United States, under the Safe Harbor agreement,
ensures the privacy of data that is transferred to certified companies (Nakashima, 2015).
However, on review, the Irish High Court referred the case to the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) on the question of whether a national data-protection authority is bound by the
commission’s finding. On this question the ECJ’s advocate general issued an advisory opinion,
which concluded that national privacy authorities are not bound by the commission’s decision.
The advocate general also concluded that the Safe Harbor provision itself lacked adequate
privacy protections for transferred data (Nakashima, 2015).
The importance of this ruling was twofold: First, it allowed each data protection authority to
examine whether a transfer of data complied with European privacy rules, and to raise the issue
with its national court if it believed it did not, and it could have its national court refer the issue
to the ECJ for a ruling (Weiss & Archick, 2016).
Second, it ruled the Safe Harbor agreement, under which the EU and the United States had been
operating for 15 years, invalid. Its rationale for this finding was that the Safe Harbor placed
“national security, public interest or law enforcement requirements” over privacy principles
(Nakashima, 2015, para. 14).
The court went on to say that in agreeing to Safe Harbor in 2000, the European Commission
erred by not determining whether U.S. law provided adequate privacy protection for Europeans
(Nakashima, 2015).
The immediate result of this ruling was that businesses that had been relying on the Safe Harbor
agreement to transfer data had to seek alternate data transfer measures. Thousands of trade and
investment relationships depended on it. According to a 2014 study, cross-border data flows
between the United States and Europe are the highest in the world and 50% higher than data
flows between the United States and Asia (Meltzer, 2014). For the short term, businesses began
using a range of alternative mechanisms to govern personal data transfers including contractual
clauses and binding corporate rules.
It was not just businesses that were concerned about the impact of this ruling, governments too
began scrambling to find a replacement mechanism and on February 2, 2016 officials from both
continents announced an agreement in principle, which they referred to as the Privacy Shield.
Almost immediately, however, critics began to assail this agreement by saying it was not strong
enough to withstand future legal challenges. Even so, many U.S. policymakers and trade groups
believe the recently concluded U.S.-EU umbrella Data Privacy and Protection Agreement
(DPPA), which seeks to better protect personal information exchanged in a law enforcement
context, and the newly enacted U.S. Judicial Redress Act, which extends the core of the judicial
redress provisions in the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974 to EU citizens, will ease enough of Europe’s
concerns about U.S. data protection standards to boost confidence in the Privacy Shield (Weiss &
Archick, 2016).
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The problem of how to handle transatlantic data transmission was exacerbated by Brexit since a
new layer of complexity has been added since the UK must now determine whether it will follow
the EU privacy shield rules or some other scenario.
As the second largest economy in Europe after Germany, and one that is extremely data
dependent, the UK must quickly resolve this issue since its economy cannot afford the
consequences of indecision. Obviously, if it had stayed part of the EU, the UK would be bound
by any data transfer agreements worked out between the EU and other governments but now that
it has voted to remove itself from Europe, what are the data transfer requirements that it and its
foreign business partners are obligated to follow?
As of May 29, 2017, when Britain officially triggered Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon, the UK
will have two years to negotiate its withdrawal from the EU (Wilkerson & Midgley, 2017).
During this time, existing EU legal agreements remain in effect and the UK must continue to
abide by EU treaties and laws even though it may not take part in any decision-making processes
of the EU (Mason, Asthana, Rankin, & Boffey, 2017). How the actual exit from the European
Union will be accomplished involves layers upon layers of political, economic and social
considerations and negotiations. Already UBS and HBSC, two if Britain’s largest financial
institutions, have decided they cannot wait to see how the country deals with the requirements of
the EU’s data privacy and transfer requirements and they have announced their decisions to
relocate (Batchelor, 2017) and according to one article up to 40% of US firms with British
offices are considering relocating to the EU (Rodionova, 2016).
Looking forward, what do the people with political and business experience foresee the effect of
Brexit being on data dependent industries? Their predictions will be discussed below.
The UK’s Possibilities According to the Experts
Views From Within the UK
Naturally, British officials want to downplay any perception that Brexit will leave a legal vacuum
that makes is unsafe for data dependent businesses to operate. Therefore, immediately after the
Brexit vote the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) issued a statement attempting to
reassure parties that the UK’s Data Protection Act of 1998 “remains the law of the land
irrespective of the referendum result” (McLellan & Felz, 2016, para.4,).
That said, however, “Baroness Neville-Rolfe, the UK minister responsible for data protection,
acknowledged that the UK’s decision to leave the EU means that ‘for a period the future will be
more uncertain’ and it is not certain if the (EU’s) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
will apply in the UK” (Out-Law, 2016, para. 2). Neville-Rolfe said that “we do not know how
closely the UK will be involved with the EU system in future,” (Out-Law, 2016, para. 3). “On
one hand if the UK remains within the single market EU, rules on data might continue to apply
fully in the UK. On other scenarios we will need to replace all EU rules with national ones”
(Out-Law, 2016, para. 3). She also put forth the possibility that the “UK could agree to a parallel
Privacy Shield directly with the US” (Out-Law, 2016, para. 14).
Another political insider, the former information commissioner of the UK, Christopher Graham,
is also on record as saying that UK data protection laws need to be updated regardless of whether
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the GDPR regulations are adopted in the country (Out-Law, 2016). However, as a practical
matter, he believes it is almost certain that the UK will end up abiding by them, at least
temporarily, due to the time it will take the country to withdraw from the EU.
So far, most of the voices coming out of Britain seem to be carrying the message of keep calm
and carry on when dealing with Brexit’s effect on data transfer policies. However, that does not
seem to be the perspective shared by others who must deal with a newly liberated United
Kingdom.
Views From Outside the UK
The predictions for the United Kingdom’s post Brexit future from outside the island nation do
not seem to be as optimistic as those proffered by British officials.
Although most experts agree that Brexit will not affect the Privacy Shield agreement, serious
concerns by industry experts are being expressed for the combined effect of Brexit and the lack
of a coherent privacy protection policy. Chris Jeffery, head of UK IT, Telecoms and Competition
at law firm Taylor Wessing, says: “the uncertainty as to whether the U.K. will be considered safe
for data flows relating to citizens from the rest of Europe is causing concern, and making some
companies consider whether data center capacity in mainland Europe is the safer bet” (Crabtree,
2016, para. 2).
Crabtree (2016) have also expressed concern that “leaving the EU could impede the U.K.’s free
movement of data to and from the continent, negatively impacting businesses” (para. 1) This
stems from the UK and EU’s potential divergence in data protection laws post-Brexit (Kovacs,
2015). Furthermore, Post-Brexit, the UK could find itself in the situation of having to
demonstrate essential equivalence in terms of protecting privacy, according to experts at the
Global Privacy Summit in Washington (Kovacs, 2015).
Dutch member of European Parliament Sophie In’t Veld, who is active on EU data protection
laws, has also pointed out problems with the UK’s surveillance laws. “We have to bear in mind
that mass surveillance was a key issue in the European Court of Justice ruling [striking down
Safe Harbor],” she said (Baker, 2016, para. 16). “The activities of the British intelligence and
law enforcement services do not appear at first sight to be substantially more in line with the
standards set by the court. So that would probably be very problematic for the UK. Not just for
trade, but also for law enforcement and intelligence” (Baker, 2016, para. 17).
Some US executives are concerned that the lack of a definitive legal system for the handling of
UK and EU data may result in expensive data transfer operations. Such uncertainty would force
many companies to face an unpleasant choice between risking major fines for noncompliance or
pulling out of Europe. While firms could, in theory, store the data entirely in Europe, doing so is
often impractical or too expensive. Antony Walker, deputy CEO of industry body techUK
explains that the U.K.’s service-based economy means that the transfer of data across borders is
fundamental and affects industries from automotive to financial services (Crabtree, 2016).
Another industry executive, Chris Jeffery, head of UK IT, Telecoms and Competition, says Brexit
is responsible for “The uncertainty as to whether the U.K. will be considered safe for data flows
relating to citizens from the rest of Europe is causing concern, and making some companies
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consider whether data center capacity in mainland Europe is the safer bet” (Crabtree, 2016, para.
2).
It is also important to note that even if the overlap between the UK’s EU membership and the
application of the GDPR in the UK were to be short lived, any UK business which trades in the
EU will have to comply with the GDPR despite Brexit taking effect. That’s because the GDPR’s
many obligations will apply to organizations located anywhere in the world which process EU
citizen’s personal data in connection with their offer of goods or services, or their monitoring
activities. Also, any UK business that has operations within the EU will have to comply with the
GDPR’s provisions. It will also have to abide by the amendments to the e-Privacy Directive
when they become finalized. If the UK were to decide not to upgrade its data protection laws to a
GDPR level standard, the question after the GDPR’s 25th May 2018 implementation will be
whether the UK laws offer data protection ‘adequacy’ for EU citizens. The answer to that will
almost certainly be that they do not. That will put the UK in the position of having to adopt either
stronger EU data protection laws or create its own EC approved data transfer mechanism (as the
US has done with the Privacy Shield).
According to a survey undertaken by Ovum, a global analyst firm, two-thirds of global
companies plan to review their business strategies in European countries as a result of
the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) (Ashford, 2015). This same survey revealed
that 68% of respondents believe the new regulations will dramatically increase their costs of
doing business in Europe, and over 50% feel they will not be able to fulfil the requirements set
out by the EU (Baker, 2016). 58% of US respondents belied that the new rules will make fines
for them inevitable and 70% of all respondents believe that the new rules favor European
businesses (Baker, 2016). Given this, what is the likelihood that the privacy shield and its
progeny will be successful?
What Does the Data Shield Require and How Does It Differ From the Safe Harbor?
The EU-US Privacy Shield addresses the failings pointed out by the European Court of Justice in
its ruling on 6 October 2015, which declared the Safe Harbor framework invalid. According to
its proponents, the new arrangement will mandate stronger obligations on companies in the US
to protect the personal data of Europeans and require stronger monitoring and enforcement by
the US Department of Commerce and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as well as increased
cooperation with European Data Protection Authorities. The new arrangement includes
commitments by the US that those who access personal data transferred to the US under the
privacy shield will be subject to clear conditions, limitations and oversight, which will prevent
generalized access. Europeans will have the opportunity to raise inquiries or complaints before a
newly established Ombudsperson.
The following is a short summary of the main elements of the new Privacy Shield regulations:
Requirements for Companies That Handle Personal Data - With Enforcement Mechanisms
US companies that want to import personal data from Europe must commit to robust obligations
on how personal data is processed and individual rights are guaranteed. The Department of
Commerce will ensure that companies publish their commitments, which makes them
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enforceable under US law by the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Also, any company that
handles human resources data from Europe must agree to comply with decisions by European
DPAs (European Commission Press Release, 2016).
Safeguards and Transparency Obligations on U.S Government Access
For the first time, the US has given the EU written assurances that the access of public
authorities for law enforcement and national security purposes will be subject to clear
limitations, safeguards and oversight. Exceptions must be used only to the extent necessary and
proportionate. The US has ruled out indiscriminate mass surveillance on personal data
transferred to the US under the privacy shield. As part of the monitoring process there will be an
annual joint review, which will also include the issue of national security access. The European
Commission and the US Department of Commerce will conduct the review and invite national
intelligence experts from both the US and European Data Protection Authorities to it (European
Commission Press Release, 2016).
Effective Protection of EU Citizens’ Rights With Several Redress Options
Any citizen who considers that their data has been misused under the privacy shield will have
several redress options. Companies have deadlines to reply to citizen complaints. European
DPAs can refer complaints to the Department of Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission.
In addition, Alternative Dispute resolution will be free of charge. For complaints on possible
access by national intelligence authorities, a new Ombudsperson has been created (European
Commission Press Release, 2016).
In addition, the revised draft addresses concerns voiced by the European Parliament, Article 29
Working Party, and European Data Protection Supervisor. It includes measures dealing with:
Bulk Data Collection
The U.S. will provide further details on its bulk data collection practices, specifying the
preconditions for targeted and focused personal data collection and safeguards for how the data
may be used.
US Ombudsperson to Address Complaints
A U.S. Ombudsperson will address complaints regarding the U.S. government’s use of EU
citizens’ personal data. The Ombudsperson will be independent from U.S. national security
services.
Data Retention Restraints
More explicit data retention restraints, requiring that personal data be deleted when it no longer
serves the purpose for which it was collected. On paper, the EU-US Privacy Shield’s
protections are stronger than Safe Harbor’s. There are clear safeguards on how U.S. government
and law enforcement agencies can access European consumers’ personal information, and it will
also be easier and cheaper for people to file complaints against companies for perceived privacy
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violations. Also, under the onward-transfer provision, third-party contractors such as email-list
processors that handle customer data must also adhere to the framework’s principles.
On July 25, 2016, the European Commission published rules associated with the Privacy Shield
agreement, along with a citizen, which provides information to EU consumers concerning how
they can file complaints about the handling of their data by US companies. With the enactment
of the EU-US Privacy Shield data transfer agreement, US businesses can start signing up for and
begin implementing its data privacy principles on August 1, 2016. This will finally put an end to
the legal no man’s land under which they have been operating since October 2015 when the Safe
Harbor was declared invalid. Of course, if its mechanisms are found lacking, European officials
can invalidate this agreement too and it will once again be a patchwork of uncertainty.
Will the Privacy Shield Survive?
Although businesses are hopeful the privacy shield will resolve the problems identified in the
Safe Harbor and provide the stability needed for business and government data transfers quite a
few civil liberty groups, on both sides of the Atlantic, remain critical complaining that that there
are no meaningful protections for European consumers against mass surveillance by the US
government. This appears to be exacerbated by the newly elected American administration
(American Civil Liberties Union, 2017). Ironically, Brexit may make it less likely that the new
privacy shield will be struck down since judges and regulators may be loath to add to the
economic uncertainty already and angst that it has created.
For its part, the European Commission not only claims to have improved the Safe Harbor
agreement in the Privacy Shield by making it more business friendly and easier for US
multinationals to legally process the personal data of EU employees and customers through a
reduction of EU red tape concerning data transfer, while at the same time claiming the privacy
shield’s data protection measures are stronger and its enforcement mechanisms more robust, it
believes this new arrangement will survive the inevitable legal scrutiny it will receive (Meyer,
2016).
Obviously, to be successful the privacy shield must be adopted by industry and so far, some
important industry leaders, such as Microsoft and Google, have indicated they are interested in
adopting the Privacy Shield (Eriksson, 2016).
However, the person who initiated the lawsuit that struck down the Safe Harbor agreement, Max
Schrems, thinks a legal challenge to the privacy shield will succeed in destroying it as well
(Eriksson, 2016). Schrems said the privacy shield agreement fails to address the ECJ’s concerns
and is full of loopholes. He maintains that US authorities can still access EU citizens’ data on
very thin grounds and that although the ECJ insisted on better access to justice, the new deal has
limited redress mechanisms to a toothless ombudsman (Eriksson, 2016). It is clear, he claims,
that the Safe Harbor’s replacement does not require the US to offer a level of protection
essentially equivalent to that of the EU (Eriksson, 2016).
What Data Privacy Rules Will the UK Follow When It Completes Brexit?
After the Brexit vote, the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) made it clear in its press
release of June 24, 2016, that the Data Protection Act of 1998 (DPA) remains the law of the land
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and all processing of personal data must be undertaken in accordance with it. However, more
recent statements confirmed that data protection law reform is necessary although the precise
form it will take is unclear (Massey, 2016).
The DPA allows personal data to be transferred freely to the European Economic Area (EEA)
member states and those countries covered by European Commission findings of adequacy. It
also provides that consent, model clauses, binding corporate rules (BCRs) and self-assessed
adequacy may be used to legitimize international transfers of personal data to countries outside
the EEA, which are not covered by an adequacy decision. In addition, although the Safe Harbor
framework is no longer a valid means for legitimizing data transfers to the US, the ICO’s
position remains that it “… will not be seeking to expedite complaints about Safe Harbor while
the process to finalize its replacement remains ongoing and businesses await the outcome”
(Massey, 2016, para. 6).
That is somewhat reassuring for businesses in the short term but what are the UK’s options for
data privacy agreements once Brexit takes effect? Experts have offered a number of possibilities.
The UK’s Options
Implement the GDPR (or Its Equivalent)
Following its exit from the EU, the U.K. may decide to implement the GDPR and repeal the DPA
through national legislation. This option would help facilitate trade links with the EU. If the UK
remains outside the EEA but implements the GDPR, or something very similar, then it is likely
that the European Commission would issue a finding of adequacy.
Use the Norwegian Model (The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Model)
Often referred to as the Norwegian model, the UK could remain a party to the European
Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, which would allow it to benefit from free trade arrangements
and be included in the EU single market. But it will also have to commit to comply with certain
fundamental EU rules and restrictions (which may defeat part of the reason for voting to leave
the EU). For Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein (the existing non-EU members of the EEA) this
currently means that they have each implemented the Data Protection Directive and the ePrivacy Directive into their respective local laws. It seems unlikely that the UK will be able to
avoid accepting the GDPR if this option is adopted (Mullock & Shooter, 2016). Under this
option, data transfers from the UK across the EEA would be permitted freely and the UK would
benefit from the European Commission’s findings of adequacy in respect of protection for
personal data. The UK (along with all other EEA Member States) would also be able to avail
itself of the protections offered by the proposed EU-US Privacy Shield regarding personal data
transfers to the US (Massey, 2016).
Just Be “Adequate”
If the UK were to leave the EU and not become a member of the EEA, it would be treated as a
third country by the EU for the purposes of international personal data transfers. As stated above,
if the UK chose to implement a new regime based on the GDPR principles it is likely that the
Commission would find the protection afforded to personal data by the UK to be adequate and
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add the UK to its white-list, of approved countries under Data Protection Directive (95/46/EU).
However, if the UK were to retain the DPA and not implement an equivalent to the GDPR, then
it is possible that no finding of adequacy would be made on the grounds that the GDPR is more
robust in its protection and requirements than the Directive (and therefore the DPA).
Furthermore, some may view the UK’s historical interpretation, implementation and pragmatic
approach in respect of the Directive as offering a lower standard of protection than that which
will be required under the GDPR. In this scenario, all personal data transfers to the UK from the
EEA would need to be legitimized by model clauses, BCRs, consent or any of the other
safeguards or derogations available under the GDPR, with the U.K. controller or processor being
the data importer in each case. This would likely require many organizations to review the
commercial contracts and data sharing arrangements that are currently in place to ensure ongoing
compliance (Massey, 2016).
Create a EU-U.K. Privacy Shield
If the UK decided to remain outside the EEA and not implement the GDPR, and instead decided
to rely on the DPA, such a regime would likely be deemed insufficient for a Commission
adequacy finding under the GDPR. In addition, the Investigatory Powers Bill (IPB), which is
currently before the UK Parliament, may make a finding of adequacy even less likely. This is
because, as currently proposed, the IPB would allow bulk personal datasets to be collected for
purposes of national security without regard to data protection compliance (Massey, 2016).
In the absence of an adequacy finding by the Commission, one possibility would be to
implement a Privacy Shield type arrangement between the UK and the EU similar to the
proposed EU-US Privacy Shield. However, the proposed terms of the IPB may mean that the UK
will find itself in a similar position to the one that the US is in at present. There would need to be
careful negotiations as to the form of arrangement allowing for international data flows to the
UK (Massey, 2016).
Create a Dual System
There is another option in which the DPA remains in force and is applied to all international data
flows from the UK outside the EEA when a controller is established in the UK. In such instances
the processing of personal data takes place exclusively in the UK and the processing is limited to
UK citizens. For all other international transfers the GDPR would apply. Among other things,
this could allow the UK to assist small businesses. However, the complexity of administration of
this proposal makes it a very impractical solution (Massey, 2016).
Use the Swiss Model
Switzerland is not a member of the EEA, but is a member of the EFTA. It accesses the EU single
market via a regularly updated bilateral agreement. Switzerland has its own data protection laws
which look and feel very similar to the laws of an EU Member State that has implemented the
Data Protection Directive. Indeed, Switzerland’s laws have been recognized as adequate by the
European Commission (EC) – i.e. adequately protective of the rights of EU citizens thereby
enabling transfers of personal data from EU data controllers to Swiss based importers to
legitimately take place. It remains to be seen whether, when and how Switzerland will update its
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current data protection laws to mirror the GDPR to ensure that its adequacy decision is not
revoked by the EC after the GDPR comes into force, although the Swiss government has already
indicated its intention to seek to retain its adequacy status after May 2018. The UK would face
the same decision in relation to GDPR adoption were it to adopt a Swiss style relationship with
the EU (Mullock & Shooter, 2016).
Go It Alone
It is also possible that the UK might seek to strike deals with the EU independently or via
collective organizations, such as the WTO (i.e. following the approach currently adopted by
countries such as Canada and the USA.) If it does, then it will have free rein to choose the form
of data protection laws that it introduces to update the DPA. However, recent history tells us that
when it comes to the question of data transfers, EU regulators and courts take an extremely dim
view of countries that do not adopt EU-strength data protection laws. The current stand-off with
the US concerning the now invalid Safe Harbor data sharing arrangement proves this point. The
UK economy, especially its financial services sector, relies on an ability to transfer data freely to
and from the UK and cannot afford a miscalculation (Mullock & Shooter, 2016).
Other Options
Britain has other options, but they are hardly more palatable. Of course, its options also depend
on the European Union which might decline to strike any deal, thus creating uncertainty in
Britain and around the world. “In a meeting between the United States Treasury secretary, Jacob
J. Lew, and the chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, Mr. Lew urged that both sides
demonstrate ‘flexibility’ in their discussions. ‘A highly integrated relationship between the E.U.
and the U.K. is in the best interests of Europe, the United States and global economic growth,
stability and security’ he said” (Alderman, 2016, para. 15).
Britain has long been known as the financial capital of Europe and as an EU member, it has been
able to protect this position by vetoing proposals to impose a single tax on the region’s financial
sector. London also won a victory at the European general court against a European Central Bank
rule that would have moved the trading of securities priced in euros to countries that use the
currency. Such a rule would have meant a huge loss of business for the banks that turned London
into Europe’s financial powerhouse. Nevertheless, with Brexit, the inability of Britain to
participate in drafting the EU’s rules may mean an end to its ability to coddle one of its biggest
industries - finance (Alderman, 2016). Thus, the stakes are huge and there is no room for error
when deciding which path to choose.
Conclusion
The unavoidable reality which the UK faces as a result of Brexit, and its need to continue trading
with the EU and the US, is that it must commit to data protection laws that are acceptable to it,
the EU and US in order to avoid being subjected to trade barriers. How it does this must be
decided as soon as possible and be in place by April of 2019. As such, it will have to accept one
of the above discussed options.
An examination of each of the options in this paper leads to the conclusion that Britain likely
adopt the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) or similar regulations.
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Assuming the UK does implement the EU’s GDPR, its primary goals must be to allow citizens to
regain control of their personal data and cut red tape for international businesses by making rules
uniform within the 28 (now 27) nation bloc (Batchelor, 2017).
On July 25, EU regulators approved the data transfer agreement and will not legally challenge it
for at least a year, although activists or Europe’s data protection authorities may still file
complaints before then. But for now businesses on both sides of the Atlantic are relieved to have
an agreement under which they can operate instead of the uncertainty and confusion which has
existed since October of 2015. The July 25, 2015 WP29 statement is a positive step for the future
of the Privacy Shield. So even though some concerns remain and legal challenges are likely. For
the time being, the Privacy Shield remains a viable new mechanism for transferring data from the
EU to the US. The regulation of data privacy, however, is an ongoing process that will never be
subject to universal agreement.
Regardless of Britain’s ultimate decision, meeting future data privacy regulations will come at a
significant cost. Businesses with more than 30% of respondents polled expected their budgets to
rise by more than 10% over the next two years as a result of the new data privacy regulations
(Alderman, 2016). Estimates for the cost of businesses becoming GDPR compliant in Britain
range from £320 million a year, and £2.1 billion over fourteen years. The EU itself predicts the
cost to be £580m (Hawkins, 2015). Given this, any business with European transactions needs to
pay attention to the viability of the privacy shield and how the UK decides to deal with its data
transfer obligations post Brexit.
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